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Abstract—Routing Protocol for low power and Lossy networks
(RPL) is a standardized routing protocol for low power and
lossy networks (LLNs) such as Internet of Things (IoT). RPL is
designed to be a simple (but efficient) and practical networking
protocol to perform routing in scalable IoT networks that
consists of thousands of resource constrained devices. These tiny
intercommunicating devices are currently in use in a large array
of IoT application services (e.g., eHealth, smart agriculture, smart
grids, and home automation). However, the lack of scalability,
the low communication reliability, and the vulnerability towards
various security threats still remains significant challenges in the
broader adoption of RPL in LLNs.
In this paper, we propose RECOUP, a reliable group commu-
nication routing protocol for IoT networks. RECOUP efficiently
uses a low-overhead cluster-based multicast routing technique
on top of the RPL protocol. RECOUP increases the probability
of message delivery to the intended destination(s), irrespective
of the network size and faults (such as broken links or non-
responsive nodes), and in the presence of misbehaving nodes.
We show that the cluster-based routing mechanism of RECOUP
remains robust in presence of various topology (i.e., rank and
sybil) and data communication (i.e., blackhole, wormhole, and
jamming) attacks targeting the IoT networking infrastructure.
An implementation of RECOUP is realized in Contiki. Our
results show the effectiveness of RECOUP over state-of-art
protocols concerning packet delivery ratio to 25%, end-to-end
delay down to 100 ms, low radio transmissions required for per
packet delivery to 6 mJ, and most importantly, it improves the
robustness and scalability of data communication process in the
whole network.
Index Terms—Internet of Things, RPL, 6LoWPAN, IPv6,
Multicast Routing, Communication Security.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Internet of Things (IoT) networks, sensors collect data
and send it to base stations or actuators for storage, processing,
and service creation [1]. The IoT devices are usually clubbed
together, logically, into groups based on their functionalities
and utility. These groups usually: (1) collect and send data
to the base station/actuators, and (2) receive specific com-
mands/requests from the base station to perform necessary ac-
tions. In particular, IoT network consist of constrained sensor
devices (also called motes) that create a Low-power Wireless
Personal Area Network (LoWPAN) in which communication
is done using a compressed Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6).
LoWPAN over IPv6 (i.e., 6LoWPAN) uses the IEEE 802.15.4
as the data-link and physical layer protocol [2] [3].
For routing in resource constrained networks such as IoT,
the Routing Protocol for Low-power and Lossy Networks
(RPL) [4] is considered as an idle routing solution. RPL
mainly supports point-to-point (P2P) communications (i.e.,
unicast), however it provides an optional support for multicast
routing. The majority of real world IoT applications such as
home automation and security management, environmental
monitoring, and smart energy monitoring would be more
benefited, if point-to-multipoint (P2M) (i.e., multicast) routing
will be in use for data dissemination and for machine-to-
machine (M2M) communication. Due to RPL’s unicast routing
nature, the low scalability, high propagation delay, and high
energy consumption becomes significant routing issues [5].
Furthermore, in RPL, the availability of a single route between
source and destination pairs cause major challenges concern-
ing communication reliability and security in the network.
Hence, it leaves the door open to multiple security threats
wherein an adversary can disrupt the routing process by just
compromising a single node in the network [6]. Therefore,
our work aims to improve communication in IoT networks,
mainly in terms of routing reliability (i.e., low delay and high
network throughput), scalability, and security.
A. Motivation and Contributions
Due to the shared wireless channel and lack of any physical
protection and tamper resistance (i.e., nodes can be easily
captured, tampered, or destroyed by an attacker), LLNs are
easily threatened by an array of security attacks. These attacks
primarily disrupt network protocols and interfere with the data
communication process. For instance, an attacker can exploit
vulnerabilities in RPL’s functionality to launch specification-
based attacks such as Rank attacks [7], DAO/DIA attacks [8],
and Version number attack [9] Furthermore, the lack of support
for mobility in RPL makes it vulnerable to mobility-based
attacks such as sybil attack as well as it increases packet loss
rate due to broken and short-lifetime links.
In this paper, we propose a reliable (i.e., able to cope with
link and node failures) and robust (i.e., able to cope with
security attacks) group communication protocol (RECOUP)
for efficient data communication in LLNs such as IoT. The key
functionalities of RECOUP are as follow: (i) virtual clusters
creation on top of RPL’s logical Destination Oriented Di-
rected Acyclic Graph (DODAG) topology, (ii) perform upward
and backward multicast routing in DODAG by using RPL’s
storing mode of operation (also called as MOP3), and (iii)
optimized inter-cluster routing for quick dissemination and
reliable delivery of multicast packets. These functionalities of
RECOUP lead to the low data packet propagation delay, high
2packet delivery ratio, and minimal effect of various topology
and communication attacks in the network. This paper is an
extension of our previous work called REMI. The basic idea
behind REMI along with the initial simulation results were
first presented in [10]. We have extended REMI along several
important dimensions which includes the following:
• the functionality of REMI’s routing mechanism has been
extended to optimize the network overhead and energy
consumption. In particular, we have added new packet
forwarding technique at root node, and the inter-cluster
routing has been optimized to control the duplicates and
broadcast messages,
• the working methodology of the RECOUP is updated
according to the extensions done on various modules of
REMI, and an example scenario has been added to better
explain the RECOUP functionalities and benefits, and
• the evaluation section is significantly enhanced by in-
cluding additional results obtained on large number of
target scenarios with varying network size, network load,
and number of attacker nodes. Additionally, the results
analysis are extended to evaluate the proposed protocol
for various new network metrics that were absent in
REMI.
In summary, the main contributions of this work are as
follow.
• We design and fully implement RECOUP, a novel and
reliable multicast routing protocol for efficient and robust
data communication in IoT networks. RECOUP makes
efficient use of RPL control messages to implement its
optimized cluster based horizontal routing mechanism,
thus it avoids additional memory and control overhead
in its execution process. Our detailed discussion on
RECOUP’s data communication reliability and robust-
ness in resisting an array of security threats in different
IoT networking scenarios show the major advantages of
RECOUP. The paper also report the key implementation
issues of RECOUP which includes energy consumption
and memory requirements on network nodes while run-
ning the RECOUP protocol.
• We perform a comprehensive performance evaluation
of RECOUP concerning various network metrics such
as end-to-end delay, packet delivery ratio, average path
cost, energy consumption, and memory requirements. To
shows the efficiency of RECOUP regarding communi-
cation reliability and robustness to security threats, the
result evaluation is done with varying network size and
in the presence of attacker nodes in the target scenario.
Furthermore, to show its effectiveness, we compare RE-
COUP with the following RPL based state-of-the-art
multicast routing protocols: (i) ESMRF [11], a enhanced
stateless multicast RPL-based forwarding protocol, and
(ii) BMRF [12], a bidirectional multicast RPL forwarding
protocol. The implementation is done in Cooja, the Con-
tiki network emulator [13], which is widely used for de-
ploying energy-constrained and memory-efficient LLNs.
We make available1 an open-source implementation of
1https://github.com/pallavikaliyar/RECOUP
RECOUP along with all the source code to the research
community.
B. Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follow. In Sec-
tion II, we discuss the state-of-the-art IoT routing protocols
and techniques that addresses the security and reliable data
communication issues in IoT networks. In Section III, we
present the system and adversary model, and the design and
implementation details of RECOUP along with its working
methodologies. In Section IV, we present the detailed perfor-
mance evaluation of RECOUP in terms of various essential
metrics using the Contiki Cooja emulator. Finally, Section V
concludes the work done in the paper along with the directions
of future work.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
In this section, first we present a brief overview of the
state-of-the-art IoT routing protocols that are designed for
6LoWPAN based wireless sensor networks. Then we discuss
the related work concerning security and reliable data com-
munication in RPL-based IoT networks.
A. Routing Protocol for Low Power and Lossy Networks
(RPL)
RPL [4] creates a virtual routing topology called
Destination-Oriented Directed Acyclic Graph (DODAG) on
top of the underlying random physical topology. DODAG is
a directed graph with no loops, oriented towards a root node
(e.g., a LLN/border router). Each node receives a rank ID
whose value depends on its distance from the root. In DODAG,
each node by default have multiple parents towards the root,
however, only a preferred one which is selected based on
routing metric and objective function is used for forwarding
data packets, while the others are kept as backup routes. The
structure of DODAG naturally supports multipoint-to-point
communication in RPL, which provides communication from
the nodes to the root with minimal routing state. The DODAG
topology is created and maintained via ICMPv6 control pack-
ets know as DODAG Information Objects (DIO). Each node
is RPL advertises DIO messages, which contains the link
and node metrics (e.g., expected transmission count (ETX),
residual energy) and an objective function that are used by
each node to select the preferred parent among the candidate
neighbors. To maintain the DODAG, DIO packets are rebroad-
cast by each node based on the Trickle algorithm [14], which
is an adaptive technique that tries to achieve a balance between
reactivity to topology changes (fast convergence/recovery) and
control overhead (energy consumption). In particular, Trickle
ensures that DIOs packets are rebroadcast at slow pace when
the network is stable, and aggressively when it is unstable. DIO
packets are also transmitted upon request when a node receives
a DODAG information solicitation (DIS) packet, which could
be sent by a new node that wants to join the DODAG.
Apart from multipoint-to-point communication, the RPL
supports point-to-multipoint and point-to-point communica-
tions in two modes called storing and non-storing modes.
3In storing mode (table-driven routing), the non-root nodes
store the routing information about all the descendant nodes
in its subtree (i.e., sub-DODAG), while in non-storing mode
(source routing) the routing information about all the nodes is
stored at the root. In both the modes, the routing information
is collected using Destination Advertisement Object (DAO)
control packets, which are transmitted by each node in the
network to announce itself as a possible destination to the root.
DOA packets are propagated towards the root, via a parent,
therefore establishing “downwards routes along the way. The
detailed working of RPL and its features are out of the scope
of this paper. Therefore, we direct the interested readers to
more comprehensive literature given in [4] and [15].
The first extension that uses the RPL functionality is pro-
posed in [16], and it is called Stateless Multicast RPL For-
warding (SMRF). In SMRF, nodes only process the multicast
packets which are coming from their preferred parents, hence
SMRF only allows the forwarding of multicast packets in
downward direction in the RPL DODAG tree. The extensions
of SMRF called Enhanced Stateless Multicast RPL Forwarding
(ESMRF) [11] in which sources of multicast traffic encapsu-
lates their multicast packet in an ICMPv6 delegation packet
and send it to the root for forwarding, and Bi-Directional Mul-
ticast Forwarding Algorithm (BMFA) [17], which improves
SMRF and enable multicasting in upward and downward
directions. Finally, authors in [12] propose the Bidirectional
Multicast RPL Forwarding (BMRF) protocol, which fully
utilizes the potential of RPL’s non-storing mode to overcome
various disadvantages of SMRF. In BMRF, when a node wants
to send a multicast message, it performs the bidirectional
forwarding. BMRF provides a choice for Link Layer unicast,
broadcast, or mixed mode to forward a multicast packet at
a parent node. Link Layer unicast or broadcast depends upon
the number of interested children and mix mode depends upon
whether the number of interested children are larger than a pre-
defined threshold value. In addition, BMRF added one more
new feature that allows a node to un-subscribe itself from a
multicast group by sending a DAO message to the preferred
parent. The main advantages of BMRF includes that it avoids
duplicates and overheads, there is no delivery disorder, and
it enables multi-sourcing, i.e., at a single time in a network
more than one source node can send multicast messages to
the same multicast destination address. However, the BMRF
also possess a set of disadvantages such as higher energy
consumption, latency, and lower communication reliability and
security.
B. Security threats to RPL and its related protocols
As RPL or an extension of RPL are the most used routing
protocols in IoT networks. We now briefly discuss the security
challenges that these protocols might face during the routing
process. Authors in [18] propose a sinkhole attack mitigation
method that integrates rank authentication with parent fail-
over. The proposal uses DIO message along with the one
way hash function technique for rank authentication. The root
node generates hash value by selecting random numbers, and
broadcast these values through DIO messages. When the root
node again broadcast the initially selected random number
securely then intermediate nodes can verify its parent rank
using the intermediate hops number. In [19] authors propose a
Merkle tree authentication based solution which can be used
to prevent wormhole attack on RPL protocol. In this proposal,
the RPL tree is formed in the reverse direction by using the
node ID and public key which are used to calculate the hash
values. After the Merkle tree formation, the authentication for
any node starts from the root node and if any intermediate
node fails to authenticate, a possible wormhole is detected.
Authors in [20] investigates the forwarding misbehaviour
(i.e., selective packet discarding) and propose a countermea-
sure of the same in LLNs running with RPL protocol. The
basic idea is to monitor the forwarding (mis)behaviour of each
node to observe the packet loss rate, and then compare the
packet loss rate of the parent node with the neighbor nodes. To
ensure that the packet loss is due to misbehaviour and not due
to bad channel quality, the nodes use one time retransmission
techniques. Similarly, using the monitoring information of
the nodes about the data packets forwarding, a trust-based
intrusion detection system based on RPL is presented in [21],
to countermeasure mobile sybil attacks in IoT networks.
In [22], authors propose solution to mitigate black hole
attack in RPL, identifying the malicious node by using a
mechanism similar to watchdog, in which the neighbour
nodes keep record of a nodes activities and analyze it find
any malicious behaviour. Authors in [23] [7] addresses the
rank2 attack, which is an attack specific to RPL. VeRA [23]
effectively fixes the vulnerabilities caused by the false rank of
a node and the DODAG version number dissemination. VeRA
does it by adding reverse hash chaining to DIO messages due
to which receivers shall be enabled to verify the advertised
hierarchy. However, in [7] authors show that VeRA remains
vulnerable to rank attacks by forgery and replay, and they
propose TRAIL (Trust Anchor Interconnection Loop), which
aims to discover and isolate bogus nodes. The key idea is to
validate upward paths to the root using a round trip message.
This is achieved without relying on encryption chains (as in
VeRA), in TRAIL a node can conclude rank integrity from
a recursively intact upward path. Recently, authors in [24]
propose a secure and scalable RPL routing protocol (SPLIT)
for IoT networks. SPLIT uses a lightweight remote attestation
technique to ensure software integrity of network nodes, thus
ensures their correct behaviour. To avoid additional overhead
caused by attestation messages, SPLIT piggybacks attestation
process on the RPL’s control messages.
III. OUR PROPOSAL: RECOUP
In this section, first we present the details of the system
and adversary models on which RECOUP is implemented
and evaluated. Then we discuss the working methodology of
our proposed protocol, i.e., RECOUP, along with its design
considerations, characteristics, and routing process.
2An attacker decreases its rank to spoil the routing topology and attract
traffic from neighbor nodes, which degrades packet delivery performance
when combined with blackhole, wormhole, or selective forwarding attacks.
4A. System Model
In our work, we assume that the system model has the
following properties.
• The target network consists of a set D = {D1, D2, ...Dn}
of size n resource constraint IoT nodes (i.e., sensors and
actuators). These nodes are static within the IoT network
area. We consider that all the nodes are homogeneous
in terms of resources, but could be different in terms of
their functionalities depending upon the configured sensor
type such as temperature, illumination, audio, pressure,
to name a few. Nodes with similar functionalities are
grouped together to form a multicast group in the net-
work. All the nodes are configured using the standard
layered protocol stack of IoT. At network layer the nodes
use RPL MOP3 (i.e., storing with multicast support) over
IPv6 as a routing protocol for data communication.
• At start, the n nodes are deployed in a random fashion,
and the RPL creates a virtual DODAG on top of the
physical network topology. Apart from the n nodes, the
network also has a resourceful nodes called LLN border
router (LBR) which acts as the root for the DODAG(s)
in the network. A network could have more than one
DODAG represented by different DODAG IDs (DIDi)
and different root nodes. Each node in the DODAG has
a rank value which specify its level in DODAG, i.e.,
distance from the root. The rank of the root is set to 0,
and the rank associated with a node increases with its
distance from root.
• In RECOUP, each DODAG is divided into a set of
clusters, and the nodes having rank 1 will act as the
clusterheads. For instance, the nodes with IDs 1, 5, 7, 12,
14, 15, and 16 in Figure 1 will act as clusterheads within
that particular DODAG. Each cluster is represented by
a unique ID (CIDi). It can be seen from the Figure 1
that nodes in DODAG are arranged in a parent and
child structure, each parent store information about its
children which includes their subscription for a multicast
group among other data. A node could be subscribed for
more than one multicast group depending upon the usage
requirements of IoT application running on top of the
network.
• Multicast routing is used to send data messages to a
group of nodes with similar functionalities. However, the
network also supports point-to-point and multipoint-to-
point routing. The source of the multicast message could
be the root node or a member of a multicast group. Data
exchanged between two communicating nodes that are
not within each others radio range will be forwarded by
intermediate nodes. All nodes are capable of operating in
upward, downward, and inter-cluster routing modes and
sensing/actuating modes.
• RECOUP uses the following additional or enhanced data
structures at different nodes (i.e., root, clusterhead, and
cluster members) in the DODAG.
– Neighbour Table (Ntab): The Ntab can be simply
created by extending the functionalities of the tradi-
tional RPL routing tables which a node stores when
routing is done in RPL’s storing mode. Usually, the
routing table at a node stores the information for
all its descendant nodes. Each Ntab entry stores
the following information about a neighbour node
(say N ): (i) cluster ID (CIDi) of N
′s cluster, (ii)
node ID of N (NID), and (iii) rank of N . As
stated before that we implement Ntab on top of
the existing information/routing table that already
exists at all the nodes in the network. The additional
information that RECOUP adds is the CID of a node
and the entires for the neighbour nodes which are
not the descendants, thus keeping the low memory
consumption. The Ntab is associated with a timer
called TrickleT imer (TT ), and the nodes update
the Ntab with new network information once this
timer expires. The value of the timer is set by
the network administrator depending upon the RPL
DODAG reformation i.e., if any new node joins the
existing DODAG or any existing node changes its
parent node within the DODAG.
– Duplicate Detection Table (DDtab): RECOUP uses
DDtab at root node for two purposes: (i) to check
for the duplicates because in RECOUP the same
packet is travelling towards root through multiple
clusters, and (ii) to hold the received packet for
a variable time duration while waiting for all the
duplicates to receive from multiple clusters. The
DDtab consists of a set of entries, where each entry
has the following information about the received
multicast packet (MPi): (i) source address (Sid),
(ii) destination address (Did), (iii) set of cluster
ID(s) from which MPi is received (CIDset) so far
i.e., ID of the cluster from which the packet or its
duplicate has been received, (iv) packet sequence
number (Nseq), (v) forwarding timer (Ftime), and
(vi) a buffer to hold the MPi until the associated
Ftime expires. Upon expiration of the Ftime, the
packet is processed and the entry is removed from
the DDtab. The tuple < Sid, Did, Nseq > is used to
discard duplicates. We have implementedDDtab as a
dynamic link list at LBRs or root only. Additionally,
same as the traditional RPL, each node in RECOUP
also stores the DDtab whose function is limited to
just detect and discard the duplicate packets, i.e., the
entries in DDtab at non-root nodes only consists of
the tuple < Sid, Did, Nseq >.
B. Adversary Model
The use of IoT networks in a large array of user-centric
applications make these networks a high profit target for the
adversaries. Hence, the adversaries would try their best to
equip themselves with advanced equipment, which means they
would have few technical advantages over the IoT nodes. In
our target IoT network, an attacker is interested in minimizing
the connectivity of the network to prevent the LBR or members
of a multicast group from detecting important events, thus
impairing their decision making system. To achieve this goal,
5the attacker selects at each time t a node to compromise
from the set D. In fact, the attacker chooses the node which
maximizes the adverse impact on the IoT services running on
top of the networking infrastructure. For instance, the attacker
could launch a rank attack followed by a blackhole attack to
create a large network partition.
In our target IoT network, the adversaries are assumed to
have the following characteristics:
• The adversary is resourceful, and it could perform the
rank, jamming, blackhole, eavesdropping, and wormhole
attacks. To launch the aforementioned attacks, it can
compromise an existing node or it can be part of an
existing network as a new node. However, we assume that
the adversary cannot compromise the LBR (i.e., DODAG
root).
• The adversary will not interfere with the proper function-
ing of the network such as modifying the data packets,
generating new messages, destroying network devices,
and tempering with the key distribution and management
operations. It is because such activities can be easily
detected by an IDS and could put the adversary at risk
of being caught [25].
TABLE I
SYMBOL TABLE
Symbol Meaning
X node in DODAG
P parent of a node
TXMP link layer transmission time of a multicast
packet
Xr rank of node X
MPi i
th multicast data packet
Src (MPi) source of MPi
MGi i
th multicast group in network
XCID ID of X’s cluster
IC set of interested children of a node
DDtab duplicate detection table
Ftime MPi hold time at LBR
CIDvisit set of cluster IDs at LBR from which MPi
is received
C2C inter cluster routing set/reset flag
X (Ntab) neighbour table at X
Pktdrop maximum hop-count for MPi in inter-
cluster forwarding
NCID ID of i
th neighbour cluster
Nj j
th neighbour from a NC
Ctravel set of clusters travelled by MPi via inter-
cluster forwarding
C. RECOUP Design Considerations
Below is the list of design considerations along with their
functioning details that were taken into account while design-
ing RECOUP protocol.
• Cluster Formation: In RECOUP clusters are formed
along with the creation of the DODAG tree, and it extends
the RPL MOP3 protocol to keep the basic functionality
of DODAG creation intact. In particular, clusters are
created virtually on top of the DODAG tree. Each cluster
within the DODAG could be seen as a separate DODAG
with clusterhead acting as its root. We limit the rank for
clusterheads to 1, i.e., only the children of the root in the
DODAG can act as clusterheads (please refer to Figure 1).
Hence the number of clusters in a network will be equal
to the number of children of a DODAG root. The root
will assign a unique ID to each cluster called cluster ID
(CID), and all the nodes that belongs to the same cluster
will share a common CID.
• Information Storage: As the nodes in RECOUP will be
configured with RPL MOP3 mode, each node will store
the essential information needed to route the messages in
upward and downward routes in their Ntab. Additionally,
the nodes will also store the duplicate detection table
DDtab as described in Section III-A. A node could
easily learn about its current neighbour set by using the
information that it receives through one-hop periodic DIO
messages and it will store this additional information
in its Ntab. These messages are sent by the nodes to
communicate their existence in network and to maintain
the DODAG topology. We add an additional field in the
DIO header to carry a node’s cluster ID which is required
to extend the functionalities of Ntab.
• Duplicate Avoidance: One way to avoid the duplicates
is that each node check the received packet for possible
duplicate before processing it. However, checking every
packet will increase the energy consumption and end-
to-end delay in the network. In RECOUP, to minimize
the duplicate messages the following optimization’s are
included: (i) the inter-cluster forwarding is limited by
using a threshold hop-count value, (ii) a node will send
a message to only one neighbour from the group of
neighbours if this group of neighbour belongs to the
same cluster, (iii) we use low transmission range (i.e., 25
meters) for data communication to reduce both, the over-
lapping in neighbouring clusters and the re-transmissions
required to forward a message to its next hop, and (iv)
a node will not forward a data packet in the direction
from which it has been received, i.e., to the children
or parent or cluster. Additionally, in RECOUP, the data
packets are always sent as a unicast. The details about
the aforementioned duplicate avoidance steps will be
presented in Section III-D.
• Multi-directional Forwarding: The multicast packet will
be is forwarded in all directions, which includes upwards
(i.e., preferred parent), downwards (i.e., interested chil-
dren) and neighbour (i.e., neighbour that is a member of
different cluster) nodes. This feature of RECOUP plays
an important role, specifically to decrease the propagation
delay and to increase the network scalability, reliability
and security.
D. RECOUP: Reliability in Data Communication and Resis-
tance against Security Threats
In this section, we present the working methodology of
RECOUP protocol, which is mainly divided into two phases.
The first phase consists of the DODAG and cluster formation.
This phase also includes the possible updates in the DODAG
and clusters that are caused by the change in network topology
triggered by node join, node leave/revocation, and node chang-
ing parent within the DODAG. The second phase consists of
the cluster-based data packet routing technique. It includes
6packet forwarding within the cluster (i.e., intra-cluster) and
in-between the neighbour clusters (i.e., inter-cluster). In this
phase, a root or non-root node could send multicast messages
in the network. The symbols used for explaining the routing
mechanism of RECOUP are shown in Table I.
1) DODAG and Cluster Creation in RECOUP: To min-
imize the convergence time of the network and to avoid
additional control messages, RECOUP uses an optimized
cluster formation approach. The cluster formation approach
is straightforward and it fully depends on the RPL’s DODAG
creation. In particular, the cluster formation is done in parallel
with the DODAG creation by using the following steps.
• The LBR broadcasts the RPL’s DAG information object
(DIO) message with the required information such as
DODAG ID, rank (i.e., 0), trickle timers etc.
• When a node receives a DIO message from neighbours,
it selects a preferred parent according to its objective
function (OF). For instance, when a node receives a DIO
message from LBR, it selects the LBR as its parent, and it
calculate its own rank (i.e., Ri = Rp+1, where Rp is the
parent rank). Once a node select its preferred parent, then
it notifies the parent by sending a DAO message, and the
parent confirm it by replying with a DAO-ACK message.
In particular, while RPL uses DIO and DIS messages to
create the upward routes (toward the LBR), it uses DAO
messages to maintain and find the downward routes in the
DODAG (from the LBR or parent node toward children
or leaf node).
• In RECOUP, a node with rank 1 will act as clusterhead,
and any node that joins a cluster (i.e., descendent of
clusterhead) will use the same cluster ID that is assigned
to the clusterhead. Initially, the clusterheads receive their
cluster IDs from the LBR in the DAO-ACK messages.
• Once the clusterheads have their unique cluster IDs
assigned by the LBR, the clusterheads broadcast DIO
messages with their own cluster ID. The nodes that
receive these DIO messages will select a preferred parent,
keep the received cluster ID, calculate their own rank
by increasing the parent rank by 1, and then broadcast
the DIO again in the network. This process is repeated
until the network constructs the routing topology (i.e.,
DODAG). If a new node joins the network, it could dis-
cover the nearest DODAG by sending the DIS message.
When a cluster member receives a DIS message, it replies
with a DIO message.
By executing the aforementioned steps, RECOUP creates
the required clusters in parallel with the formation of the
DODAG, thus minimizes both, the control overhead messages
and the network convergence time. As the cluster formation
is closely coupled with the RPL’s DODAG creation, there is
no need to perform the cluster maintenance as it happens au-
tomatically with DODAG’s re-creation process. The DODAG
re-creation or update is triggered either due to node changes
parent or due to leaving or joining of IoT nodes in the network.
2) Data Routing in RECOUP: Due to the use of multicast
routing in large array of practical IoT applications, we evaluate
and analyze the performance of RECOUP mainly for multicast
communications. However, RECOUP also supports unicast
Algorithm 1 LBR multicast packet routing process in RE-
COUP
INPUT at a Node: Data packet
OUTPUT: Forward the data packet towards its destination
1: if X has a MPi to send to MGi then
2: if X ∈ MGi then
3: deliver MPi up to the network stack
4: end if
5: if Src (MPi) = LBR then
6: perform only downward routing
7: LBR use source-routing to route MPi
8: else
9: if X = LBR then
10: create new entry in DDtab for MPi
11: Ftime ← (TXMP ×Xr + α) and associate Ftime
with the entry
12: while Ftime 6= 0 do
13: update CIDvisit for each duplicate MPi
14: end while
15: if (IC ← IC ∩ CIDvisit) = NULL then
16: drop the packet
17: else
18: set C2C ← 1
19: transmit MPi to members of IC
20: GOTO Algorithm 2
21: end if
22: else
23: GOTO Algorithm 2
24: end if
25: end if
26: end if
routing. When a source node wants to send a multicast packet
using RECOUP, it transmit the packet in following three
directions: (i) upward, i.e., towards LBR through its preferred
parent; (ii) downward, i.e., towards interested children who
are registered for the multicast group that is specified as the
destination address in the transmitting packet header; and (iii)
inter-cluster, i.e., toward neighbour(s) with different cluster ID.
In case where the source node has multiple neighbours that
belongs to the same cluster, the packet is sent to only one of the
neighbour from that cluster. It is because if a single node in the
cluster receives the packet, later it will be disseminated in the
whole cluster. Next, we discuss the functionality of the routing
mechanism of RECOUP for all possible data communication
scenarios in an IoT network.
3) Routing at LBR Node: Algorithm 1 shows the routing
procedure at LBR/root node when it has a multicast data
packet (say MPi) to send (i.e., LBR is the source node) or to
forward (i.e., LBR act as an intermediate node). If LBR is the
source of MPi, then it can perform the downward multicast
routing by simply performing the source routing which uses
the global network information stored in its routing table. In
particular, the LBR send MPi to its interested children (i.e.,
the children that are subscribed to the destination multicast
address specified in the packet), which also do the same
7and this process continues until the packet reaches to all the
subscribed nodes of the multicast group. On the other hand, if
the LBR is not the source ofMPi, this indicates that the packet
is received from one or more of the underlying clusters. As the
same packet might be traveling towards LBR from multiple
clusters due to our inter-cluster routing, the LBR will possibly
receive duplicate copies of MPi. When the LBR receive the
first copy of MPi, it creates a new entry in its DDtab. The
entry contains a buffer to store the received packet along with
other information as described in Section III-A. Additionally,
the LBR associates a timer called Ftime with each new entry.
The value of Ftime is calculated by multiplying the rank of the
source ofMPi to the time taken to transmit a packet from one
hop to the next hop. A random time value (say α) is also added
to Ftime to ensure that the LBR will receive all the duplicates
of MPi from the cluster. The lower value of α will increase
the number of duplicates in the network because the LBR
might falsely forward the MPi in the clusters which already
have the MPi through inter-cluster routing. Alternatively, the
large value of α will increase the waiting time ofMPi at LBR
which will increase the routing end-to-end delay in network. In
RECOUP, the initial value of α is set to 0, and it is gradually
increased in proportional to the number of duplicates received
for an MPi after it is forwarded by the LBR. Specifically, for
a data session, apart from the initial value of α which is set
to 0, the subsequent values of α is estimated as follows.
α = αprev + (TXlast
MP
− F prevtime ) (1)
Where αprev is the previous value of α, TXlast
MP
is the total
time by which all the copies of MPi has been received at
LBR, and F
prev
time is the previous hold time at LBR for MPi.
Once the Ftime associated with an entry in DDtab is
expired, the LBR forward the buffered MPi to the interested
children (IC). The LBR will only forward theMPi towards the
clusters from which it has not received the MPi because the
interested members in remaining clusters have already received
the MPi during inter-cluster routing. For this purpose, before
forwarding the MPi to its IC, the LBR re-calculate its IC
set (refer line 15 in Algorithm 1. It removes the children that
belongs to the clusters which have already seen the MPi in
its way up towards the LBR. After re-calculation of IC, if the
new IC set is empty, the LBR drops the packet. Additionally,
to ensure that the inter-cluster routing will not happen in case
where the MPi is travelling from the LBR to the clusters,
we use C2C flag bit in IPv6 header of the MPi. When an
intermediate node founds that the C2C flag bit is set to 1, it
will perform only the downward routing as the upward routing
and inter-cluster routing has already been taken place in past
for this packet. Please note that in RECOUP all the hop-to-
hop data packet transmissions in downward routing are done
using an Optimized Forwarding Mechanism (OFM) scheme as
presented for BMRF protocol in [12].
4) Routing at non-LBR Node: Algorithm 2 shows the work-
ing methodology of RECOUP routing protocol when a non-
LBR/root node (X) has a data packet to send to a multicast
destination address. When X sends a multicast packet (say
MPi) as a source node, it goes through the following steps.
Algorithm 2 Non-root node(s) multicast packet routing pro-
cess in RECOUP
INPUT at a Node: Data packet
OUTPUT: Forward the data packet towards its destination
1: if X has a MPi to send to MGi then
2: if X = Src MPi then
3: Pktdrop ← Xr
4: Ctravel ← XCID ∪NCID
5: X forward MPi towards XP , XIC , and X(Nj) here
1 to j neighbors of X each with different CID
6: else
7: if X receives MPi from XP then
8: perform only downward routing
9: if C2C = 0 then
10: forward MPi to P , IC, and Nj
11: else
12: forward MPi to IC
13: end if
14: end if
15: end if
16: if XP ∨ XIC ∨ X(Nj) receives MPi then
17: if routing = inter-cluster ∨ routing = within X ′s
cluster then
18: while Pktdrop 6= 0 do
19: Pktdrop ← Pktdrop − 1
20: Update Ctravel by adding CIDs of Nj that are
not present in Ctravel
21: forward MPi to P , IC, and Nj
22: end while
23: else
24: forward MPi to P and IC
25: end if
26: if LBR receives MPi then
27: GOTO Algorithm 1
28: end if
29: end if
30: end if
• X set the Pktdrop (i.e., maximum number of forwarding
hop-counts for MPi in inter-cluster routing) equal to
the rank of X (Xr). This is done to avoid the routing
loops in the network and to control the number of
forwards of MPi which minimizes the duplicates as well
as congestion in the network. The reason that we set
Pktdrop to Xr is because after this many number of
hops the MPi will reach to the LBR, and then the LBR
could simply send the packet to the remaining interested
children using downward multicast routing. The Pktdrop
is set by the source node only, and it can be updated by
intermediate nodes which decrements it until the value
reaches to 0 (refer lines 17 to 19 in Algorithm 2).
• X set the Ctravel that consists of a set of cluster IDs
of the clusters in which MPi is already forwarded. At
the beginning of the routing of MPi (i.e., when it is
at the source node), the Ctravel at node X contains
the ID of X ′s cluster and the ID of the clusters to
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which the neighbour nodes of X belongs (refer line 4 in
Algorithm 2). We do not consider the siblings neighbours
because all the siblings have the same cluster ID. If a node
has no neighbour than its NCID set remains empty. The
intermediate nodes keep on updating the Ctravel in MPi
with new cluster IDs before forwarding the MPi to the
nodes with cluster IDs that are not present in current
Ctravel. Both, the Pktdrop and the Ctravel values are
added in the RPL Packet Information field which is given
in IPv6 header format.
• OnceX sets the Pktdrop and Ctravel, it transmit theMPi
to its preferred parent (P), interested children (IC), and
the neighbours (Nj) with different cluster IDs. In case
there are more than one neighbours of X that belongs
to a same cluster, X randomly send the MPi to only
one neighbour from that cluster. This is because the
other nodes will receive the MPi when the intra-cluster
3
routing is performed for MPi.
In general, to decrease the number of duplicates in the
network, a node (including LBR) never forwards a packet to
the node or cluster from which the packet has been received.
As it can be seen from Algorithm 2 that if the received packet
is not a duplicate, the node perform the following steps.
3the intra cluster routing consists of the traditional upward and downward
routing techniques that are used for data transmission in RPL’s storing mode,
i.e., MOP3.
• If the packet is received from a Preferred Parent (refer
lines 7 to 12 in Algorithm 2):
– Step1: node checks the packet header for C2C flag
status, if the flag is not set (i.e., 0), the node is
allowed to forward packet to its neighbours that
belong to different clusters, else node goes to Step
2.
– Step2: node checks its routing table (or multicast
group subscription table) for any interested children
that are registered for the multicast address specified
in the received packet and then forward packet to
them by using OFM, else the node goes to Step 3.
– Step3: if the node itself is a member of the multicast
group given in the received packet, then send the
packet up to the network stack else discard the
packet.
• If the packet is received from a neighbour/children (refer
lines 16 to 12 in Algorithm 2):
– Step4: node forward the packet to its preferred
parent.
– Step5: node perform the aforementioned steps 1, 2
and 3.
• If a non-root source mote wants to send packet(s), then
it will execute the above mentioned steps 1, 2 and 4.
5) Example of RECOUP Routing Procedure: For better
understanding routing process of RECOUP, let’s consider an
9IoT network scenario as depicted in Figure 1. The Figure 1
show the network state after completion of the DODAG
formation and cluster creation phase while executing RECOUP
protocol in the Contiki Cooja emulator. In Figure 1, nodes 1,
5, 7, 12, 14, 15 and 16 are the cluster heads of the DODAG,
and node 31 is the source node of a multicast group which also
include nodes 4, 16, 21, 24, 30 and 38. Assume that the cluster
IDs of the clusters is same as the node ID of the clusterhead.
Node 31 execute the multicast packet transmission pro-
cedure as follow: (i) it transmit the multicast packet to its
preferred parent i.e., 29; (ii) their are no interested children
so it will not send the packet to 32; (iii) in its neighbour
set their are only two nodes that does not belong to node
31’s cluster, i.e., 34 and 36, but both these nodes belong to
the same cluster, so 31 will forward the packet to 34 as it
has higher rank than 36. As shown in Figure 1 that from
29 the packet travel towards the root by executing steps 1-
4, meanwhile serving all the destination nodes (if any, such
as 30) in the way. However, at the same time (i.e., while
traveling towards the root) the packet is also disseminated in
the various clusters. For instance, upon reception of the packet
from node 31, 34 forward it to 6, and it forward the packet to
the neighbour cluster by sending it to 4. Node 34 also send
the packet towards 38 through 37 because it is registered with
the multicast address given in the packet. In this way, the
packet travels vertically as well as horizontally at the same
time, thus it deceases the propagation delay of the packet for
their destinations.
It is seen in Figure 1 that the total number of transmissions
(TXn) required to send a multicast packet from node 31 to
all its destinations using RECOUP routing mechanism is 13.
While, by using the BMRF and RPL MOP 3 the TXn required
is 17. However, the end-to-end propagation delay is not
directly proportional because the packet is travelling in various
clusters in parallel. For instance, node 29 forwards the packet
to node 30 in parallel when 34 forwards it to 37. The value of
TXn greatly depends on the network topology (i.e., DODAG
formation) and the position of source and destination nodes.
For example, if we add the node 34 in the multicast group and
remove 38, then the TXn required for RECOUP will decrease
by a value of two, i.e., TXn = 11, while for BMRF and RPL
MOP 3 it will increase by three, i.e., TXn = 20. We are
using TXn parameter because it affect various other metrics
that define the communication reliability and scalability in
a network. In particular, lower TXn implies low end-to-end
delay and inherent routing support for scalability.
6) Optimized Forwarding Mechanism: The RECOUP pro-
tocol uses “Optimized Forwarding Mechanism” (OFM) to
minimize forwarding of messages during downward routing.
In particular, when a parent receives a multicast packet, and it
has n number of interested children for the packet, the parent
need to decide whether to send the packet to each children
using unicast mode (i.e., create n packets and send one to
each child) or to perform a broadcast and all its children
will receive the packet. The trade-off between unicast and
broadcast mode occurs because the use of unicast mode require
more energy consumption as same message is sent by parent
for n number of times, while the broadcast makes all the
children (including the non-interested ones) to receive the
packet in one transmission.
The RECOUP protocol uses OFM as follow:
• Upward forwarding is done using Link Layer unicast
because a node has only one preferred parent at any
time during communication process. The inter-cluster
forwarding is also done by Link Layer unicast as only
one node from a neighbouring cluster needs to receive
the message to circulate it in the whole cluster.
• Downward forwarding is done based on the Mixed mode
decision algorithm proposed in BMRF [12] with three as
a threshold value in mixed mode.
TABLE II
SIMULATION PARAMETERS FOR RECOUP PROTOCOL EVALUATION
Parameters Values
Emulator Cooja on Contiki v2.7
Simulation time 10 Minutes
Scenario Dimension 200 x 200 to 800 x 800 sq.meter
Node distribution Random
Number of nodes 51 to 201 sky motes (including root)
Transport layer protocol UDP
Number of source motes 8
Routing Protocols ESMRF, BMRF, and RECOUP
Root waiting timer t Depends on the value of α
Multicast group or Sub-
scriptions
20%, 40%, 60%, 80%
Radio Medium Unit Disk Graph Medium (UDGM)
PHY and MAC Layer IEEE 802.15.4 with CSMA and ContikiMAC
RNG Seed 30 iterations each with new seed
Application protocol CBR
Transmission Range 25m
Number of attacker nodes 10% to 40%
Traffic rate 0.50 pkt/sec - 500 packets
ESMRF Contiki v2.7 Default Configuration
BMRF and RECOUP Mixed mode (Threshold: 3)
IV. SIMULATION AND RESULT EVALUATION
In this section, we present the performance evaluation of our
proposed RECOUP protocol by using the simulation results.
We have compared the performance of RECOUP protocol
with the state-of-the-art protocols that includes ESMRF [11], a
enhanced stateless multicast RPL-based forwarding protocol,
and BMRF [12], a bidirectional multicast RPL forwarding
protocol. We have fully implemented RECOUP protocol on
Cooja, the Contiki network emulator [26], and we used
the available open source codes of ESMRF and BMRF for
comparison purposes. Table II provide the details of various
parameters along with their values that we have used to
configure the target IoT network scenarios in Contiki Cooja
emulator.
A. Performance analysis
In this section, we present the performance analysis of our
proposed protocol in terms of various metrics and compare it
with the most relevant and recent state-of-the-art works. The
evaluation metrics that we have used are as follow: (i) packet
delivery ratio, (ii) end-to-end delay, (iii) per packet energy
consumption, and (iv) memory consumption. The values for
these metrics are calculated in different IoT scenarios that are
created by varying network size, network traffic, and attacker
nodes. The attacker nodes could perform either the rank attack
10
or the blackhole attack to disrupt data communication pro-
cess. The source and multicast destination nodes are selected
randomly, and the final results plotted are the average of 30
simulation runs each with different seed value.
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1) Effect of increase in network load: In this section, we
discuss how the various networking parameters (e.g., packet
delivery ratio, end-to-end delay, and energy consumption) are
 16
 16.4
 16.8
 17.2
 17.6
 18
 18.4
 18.8
 19.2
 19.6
 20
 20.4
 20.8
 21.2
 21.6
 22
 22.4
 22.8
 23.2
 23.6
 24
 20  40  60  80O
ve
ra
ll 
en
er
gy
 c
on
su
m
pt
io
n 
in
 n
et
w
or
k 
(m
J)
Number of sink nodes (%)
ESMRF BMRF RECOUP
Fig. 5. Overall energy consumption with increased percentage of
sinks
influenced by the change in the percentage of subscribers
(or sinks/destinations) in the target network for the ESMRF,
BMRF and RECOUP routing protocols. It should be noted that
in the target network scenario we are varying the number of
sink node’s percentage in the range of 20% to 80% but keeping
the fixed number of source nodes (i.e., 8). With the increase
in the sink nodes in the network, the network traffic increases
as more number of packets are travelling (depending upon the
location of the destination) in the network. For these scenarios
we assume that no adversary is present in the network, and
the network consists of 100 nodes (excluding the LBR/root).
Figure 2 shows the change in the average Packet Delivery
Ratio (PDR) for all the comparing protocols with increase
in the percentage of sink nodes. As shown in Figure 2, the
PDR of RECOUP remains higher as compared to ESMRF
and BMRF. However, BMRF and RECOUP has more or
less have same the PDR due to their upward and downward
forwarding mechanism, RECOUP has slightly higher PDR
then BMRF due to its inter-cluster forwarding rule. The
inter-cluster forwarding helps RECOUP to disseminate the
packets even in (small) partitioned network areas, additionally
it forward the packets by going around the broken or weak
links which might have been created due to node transmission
range or interference. ESMRF has the lowest PDR due to its
strict upward and downward forwarding mechanism which
increases the number of transmission required to send the
packet to all the destinations.
Figure 3 depicts the effect on average End-to-End Delay
(EED) for all the comparing protocols with increase in the
percentage of sink nodes. It can be seen from the figure
that RECOUP remains too low when compared with the
ESMRF and BMRF. This is because in RECOUP for most
of the times the packets reaches to its intended destinations
without travelling through root. For instance in Figure 1, the
node 38 receive all its packets in three transmissions while
for ESMRF and BMRF the packets will have to travel 9
hops before it reaches to node 38. In particular, the use
of efficient inter-cluster forwarding along with the upward
and downward forwarding of multicast messages in RECOUP
protocol triggers a quick dissemination of packets in the whole
11
network in no time. Due the aforementioned reason the energy
consumption for per packet (ECP) delivery is also lower in
RECOUP as it is shown in Figure 4. In Figure 4, BMRF has
lower energy consumption then ESMRF due to two reasons,
first it uses the optimized forwarding scheme and second it
serves the destinations while forwarding a packet towards root
node.
Although, the ECP of RECOUP is lower than other compar-
ing protocols, but same is not true when the energy consump-
tion of the whole network is calculated, this is depicted in
Figure 5. This is because the number of packet transmissions
are higher in RECOUP. This is because in RECOUP a packet
might have to travel in a neighbour cluster even in the cases
in which no multicast member(s) resides in that cluster. This
is the cost that RECOUP has to pay to achieve improved
network reliability and resistance to an array of routing attacks.
However, as the network load increases the additional energy
consumption with respect to the network throughput will
start decreasing as more and more sinks will benefited by
RECOUP’s inter-cluster routing scheme.
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2) Effect of increased in network size: In this section, we
present the effect of increase in the network size for all the
comparing protocols. This is important for the applications
where scalabilty of the network is an important factor. In this
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Fig. 8. Energy consumption with increased network size
scenario, we fix the number of source (i.e., 8) and sinks (i.e.,
40%).
The effect on PDR with increase in network size for all
the comparing protocols in shown in Figure 6. It can be seen
in Figure 6 that BMRF and RECOUP protocols remain less
affected by the increase in network size when compared to
ESMRF. With the increase in network size, the number of
transmissions and number of hops between the source and des-
tinations increase greatly, however, due to inter-cluster routing
the increase in number of intermediate hops in RECOUP is not
to high, which helps it to keep the PDR higher even in large
networks. The results for the EED in Figure 7 also support
the aforementioned reason as it shows the lower increase in
EED for RECOUP with increased network size.
The change in the energy consumption for per packet (ECP)
delivery for the comparing protocols with increase in network
size is shown in Figure 8. As the network size increases, the
number of duplicate packets also increases for the RECOUP
protocol, thus, the ECP increases. It is because we are also
taking into account the energy consumed by receiving of a
duplicate packet at a destination node. The increase in ECP for
ESMRF and BMRF is mainly due to increase in the number of
transmissions required for a packet to reach to its destinations.
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3) Effect of increase in number of attacker nodes: In
this section, we evaluate the performance of RECOUP in
presence of attacker nodes. We randomly configure nodes to
either perform the rank attack followed by selective packet
discarding or the blackhole attack. The rank attack will disrupt
the correct formation of DODAG, thus it creates weak or
broken links in the network, while the blackhole attacker
will drop all the received packets without forwarding, thus
it decreases the packet delivery ratio. Figure 9 show the effect
on PDR with increase in number of attackers for all the
comparing protocols. In this scenario, we set the network size
to 101 nodes with 8 source nodes and 40% sink nodes. It
can be seen from Figure 9 that RECOUP has minimal effect
of the attacker presence due to its inter-cluster forwarding
mechanism. For instance, while using ESMRF and BMRF
protocols, if node 29 behaves like a blackhole attacker in the
topology given in Figure 1, then all the packets sent by source
node 31 will never reach to its destination nodes. Alternatively,
if RECOUP is running as the routing protocol, then all its
destinations (except node 30) will receive the packets sent
by 31. This behaviour of RECOUP greatly increase its PDR
even in the presence of attackers. Although RECOUP only
provides communication robustness in presence of attackers,
and it does not detect the attackers, but it can be easily done
by using a traffic analysis tool at LBR, which when see that
the packets sent by 31 are received through other clusters but
not from its own cluster could generate a security alarm. Due
to the aforementioned functionality of RECOUP, we can see in
Figure 10 that RECOUP has the highest PDR for both attacks
when it is compared with ESMRF and BMRF protocols. It has
been also seen that the position of the attacker greatly affects
the PDR as the attacker near the root is much more effective
when compared with the attackers residing close to leaf nodes.
Although we have only tested RECOUP in presence of rank
and blackhole attacks, but from the functionality of RECOUP
it is clear that it can effectively minimize the effects of other
routing attacks such as jamming and sybil attacks. It is because
in RECOUP the packet travels through multiple routes toward
its destination, hence the failure or maliciousness of few nodes
or links won’t effect much to its routing process.
Figure 11 shows how the increase in number of attackers
affect the ECP delivery for all the three comparing protocols.
The ECP for ESMRF, BMRF, and RECOUP protocols in-
creases with the increase in the attackers in the network. It
is because the presence of attackers (mainly the rank attacker)
on routing paths increases the number of hop-to-hop re-
transmissions. Additionally, the increase in routing path length
and disruption in DODAG creation caused by rank attack will
leave the network with non-optimal routes. As the RECOUP
does not provide any mitigation to these attacks, the increase
in the energy consumption per packet shows the same trend
for all the protocols.
TABLE III
MEMORY USAGE
Flash [Bytes] RAM [Bytes]
ContikiRPL 41498 8246
RECOUP 488 (+1.2%) 292 (+3.5%)
Total 42170 (+1.2%) 8574 (+3.5%)
Finally, Table III shows ContikiRPL memory consump-
tion [27] and overall code and data memory increase when im-
plementing RECOUP. The memory consumption in RECOUP
is slightly higher than the state-of-the-art protocols. In order
to correctly implement all the functionalities of RECOUP
protocol, following additional information is stored at a node:
(i) to perform the duplication detection, a node needs to create
and maintain, the DDtab, this table consists of three fields
(i.e., message sequence number and source-destination address
pairs); and (ii) a new field is added in neighbour table which
consists of entries of its neighbours Cluster ID (Cid). The cost
of RECOUP is 488 Byte of Flash and 292 Byte of RAM. We
consider around 95 to 100 entries for both the tables, which
are sufficiently large amount w.r.t a large IoT network. The
additional memory consumption in RECOUP compared to the
traditional RPL protocol is almost negligible considering the
additional features it provides.
4) Discussion on data communication reliability and se-
curity: The optimized inter-cluster forwarding mechanism
used in RECOUP greatly reduces single point of failures in
the network, thus it makes the communication system more
robust and reliable for data communications. All the existing
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multicast routing approaches suffer from the scalability issue.
It is because as the number of nodes increases in the network,
the size of DODAG tree increases which causes increase in
the number of hops traveled by a message and it decreases
the packet delivery ratio. It further increases the following: (i)
probability of a route break, (ii) the energy consumption, and
(iii) the end-to-end delay. Apart from the end-to-end delay, the
PDR is a critical metric in various application scenarios where
sensitive operations are dependent on the information received
from other parts of the network. Hence, we believe that
providing communication reliability along with the network
scalability while keeping in mind the constrained nature of
IoT devices is a major challenge for routing protocols in IoT
networks.
Communication security is considered as one of the key
challenges in IoT networks due to its openness. In [28],
authors discuss few of the well known security attacks on the
RPL protocol which includes selective-forwarding, sinkhole,
blackhole, wormhole, clone ID or sybil, and rank attacks [29].
Their research shows that the RPL protocol running on top of
6LoWPAN networks is vulnerable to all the aforementioned
attacks. Furthermore, all the existing extensions of RPL which
includes the ESMRF and BMRF also fails to address any
of these security threats in IoT networks. It is because all
these protocols use the DODAG topology which contains the
possibility of single point of failure. For instance, in Figure 1,
if node 9 is down due to some technical fault or an attack
performed by some adversary, all the messages sent by it will
never reach to its destination nodes (i.e., 4, 16, 21 and 24).
In IoT network scenarios, depending upon the application
requirements, we might have real time deadlines. However, the
devices are deployed in an insecure environment, thus ensuring
the communication reliability, and on-time and secure commu-
nication are crucial aspects. To this end, RECOUP performs
the data communication in a way that ensures that it will avoid
the single point failures, push the network communication
towards scalability, minimize the effects network partitioning,
and reduce the propagation delay for recipients of the data
packets. Rather than getting failed in an IoT environment,
our protocol works reasonably better and send its data traffic
successfully. Due to the inter-cluster communication which
triggers a faster dissemination of the information, RECOUP is
able to easily mitigate the worst effects of few of the aforemen-
tioned attacks. The scalability and quick dissemination features
of RECOUP could also be very helpful in enhancing the per-
formance of large scale attestation techniques [24] used in IoT
networks. These attestation techniques dynamically verifies
the integrity of various software and hardware components
residing on an IoT device at runtime which increases the
network security.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose a novel reliable and robust
multicast routing protocol (RECOUP) for Low-power and
Lossy Networks such as 6LoWPAN, which are highly used for
deploying IoT networks for various smart service applications.
RECOUP uses the advantages of the recently proposed BMRF
protocol which includes support for dynamic group registra-
tions and enabling upward and downward forwarding, and it
addresses BMRF’s key disadvantages such as higher end-to-
end delay, low security against single point of failures, and low
scalability. We show that RECOUP remains largely unaffected
from rank and blackhole attacks as it delivers more than 80%
of data packets to destinations in the presence of attackers.
From the simulation results, we can conclude that RECOUP
effectively achieve its goals (reliability and robustness) at the
expense of a slightly higher energy and memory consumption.
Please note that RECOUP does not aims to provide explicit
security solutions for various attacks (e.g., blackhole, rank
attack, selective packet discarding, wormhole, etc), however,
it proves that it is robust and effective in data communication
process in the presence of these attacks.
As the RECOUP protocol only provide resistance for the
security attacks but not the mitigation, in the future work, from
the security point of view we are looking to embed algorithms
to countermeasure more specific (to IoT network) attacks such
as rank attacks.
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